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Abstract 
Radical movements colored the 2019 Elections, especially the dichotomy of the Jokowi and Prabowo camps. This 
phenomenon also occurs among the people of Yogyakarta after the 2019 Presidential Election. The research aims 
to map the transformation of fundamentalist groups in Yogyakarta after the 2019 Presidential Election. The 
significant analysis was carried out to provide sources of information to the public and government regarding the 
transformation of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) after the 2019 Presidential Election. The researchers used 
qualitative descriptive methods with the analysis of the theory of social resource mobilization. The research 
results showed that the transformation of the radical movement that formerly took the anarchist forms and down 
to the streets, now are more focused and organized by entering the community through religious education and 
recitation groups, both in universities and at household meetings. This research concludes that in order not to be 
parallel to HTI, which the government dissolved, the transformation of tranquility is one way to maintain the 
existence of radical organizations but in a more friendly framework or guise. All of these resource mobilization 
movements take the form of informal social networks.  
Gerakan radikal mewarnai Pemilu 2019, terutama dikotomi kubu Jokowi dan Prabowo. Fenomena ini juga terjadi 
di kalangan masyarakat Yogyakarta pasca Pilpres 2019. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memetakan transformasi 
kelompok fundamentalis di Yogyakarta pasca Pilpres 2019. Analisis signifikan dilakukan untuk memberikan 
sumber informasi kepada masyarakat dan Pemerintah terkait transformasi Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) pasca 
Pilpres 2019. Peneliti menggunakan metode deskriptif kualitatif dengan analisis teori mobilisasi sumber daya 
sosial. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa transformasi gerakan radikal yang dahulu mengambil bentuk anarkis 
dan turun ke jalan, kini lebih terfokus dan terorganisir dengan memasuki masyarakat melalui pendidikan agama 
dan kelompok pengajian, baik di perguruan tinggi maupun di pertemuan-pertemuan rumah tangga. Penelitian ini 
menyimpulkan bahwa agar tidak sejajar dengan HTI yang dibubarkan pemerintah, transformasi ketentraman 
merupakan salah satu cara untuk mempertahankan eksistensi organisasi radikal namun dalam kerangka atau 
kedok yang lebih bersahabat. Semua gerakan mobilisasi sumber daya ini berbentuk jaringan sosial informal. 
Keywords:  transformation; social movement; post 2019 Presidential Election; 
fundamentalist groups  
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Introduction 
The fall of Soeharto from the Indonesian 
presidency has brought many changes in the 
social context of Indonesia, one of which is the 
increasing activities and the increasing numbers 
of religious-based organizations. The new 
democracy opens a space for equal participation 
for community groups to express their interest. 
In a democracy, every citizen has the right to 
express opinions and form associations 
following the prevailing laws and regulations. 
Every citizen also enjoys the same status before 
the law. That means, as long as current laws and 
regulations are justified, democratic regimes 
must fight for differences for everyone. Demo-
cracy must give every citizen the right to exist, 
regardless of their social, cultural, and religious 
background. 
Democracy opens opportunities for the 
emergence of various political, economic, and 
religious organizations as manifestations of 
freedom of expression (Hasan 2018). Inevitably, 
this transition period also opened space for the 
growth of religious organizations with various 
characters. The emergence of various organiza-
tions such as Islamic militant: Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), 
Majlis Mujahiddin Indonesia (MMI), and Jama‘ah 
Islamiyah (JI) (Fatkhuri 2012). 
Most radical groups support Islamic ideology, 
which declares war on all members of society to 
replace the democratic system that is considered 
to be from the West. For them, a democratic 
system does not represent Islam because that 
religion has never recognized the word demo-
cracy. Democracy is considered a creation of 
human wisdom, and people are more concerned 
with it. The radicals call it "rebellion against 
God's sovereignty." (Lawrence 1989). Take 
advantage of Indonesian democracy, but the 
movement's agenda is to overthrow democracy 
itself through violence or peaceful means. This is 
done in a completely revolutionary way. 
The influence of this mass organization is 
obvious, especially in the political dynamics that 
occur in Indonesia. The presence of space for 
them to express and voice their opinions be-
comes a threat to Indonesia, and this can be seen 
from several terrorist incidents that are often 
associated with the interventions of Islamic 
organizations in Indonesia (Mubarak 2015). The 
rise of radical understanding that grows during 
the lives of the Indonesian people has triggered 
the growth of local transmissions in several 
regions in Indonesia that are suspected of being 
the arena for playing these radical groups and as 
a location for education for potential radical 
members (IPAC 2020). 
Radicalism as a concept has changed its 
meaning a lot. Many political parties in the 19th 
century called themselves radical, becoming 
radical, especially on issues such as supporting 
republicanism over royalism. Some radical 
groups demand the introduction of a democratic 
system in which the right to vote is not linked to 
property ownership or gender. Most of them are 
reformers and not revolutionaries. Some of the 
radical demands of the 19th century have 
become mainstream rights today. In other 
words, the radical concept's content has changed 
dramatically in less than a century. In contrast, in 
the 19th century, radicalism mainly refers to the 
political position that led to the extreme religious 
era movement (Schmid 2013). 
The Transformation of Radical Movement in Yogyakarta ….  
JSW (Jurnal Sosiologi Walisongo) – Volume 5, No. 1 (2021) │ 95 
However, the rise of radicalism was being 
suppressed by the government. It can be seen 
from the legislations for suppressing various 
actions from these mass organizations, one of 
which was the dissolution of HTI (Hizbut Tahrir 
Indonesia) (Erdianto 2017). The government in 
the first period left various social phenomena in 
the environment of civil society, including in the 
implementation of counter-radicalism programs 
that were included in the list of major govern-
ment programs. Precisely in 2017, where 
President Joko Widodo issued a policy that drew 
the attention of Muslim clerics groups, namely 
revoking the legal permission to establish HTI 
The revocation of the HTI permit as a com-
munity organization in Indonesia was allegedly 
caused by the existence of radical motive 
motives within the organization (Aisy et al. 
2019). 
The counter-radicalism program carried out 
by President Joko Widodo is a form of response 
to the rampant acts of terrorism and violence 
targeting minority groups and civilians as 
victims, as happened in 2016 (Lucky and 
Kushindarti 2017). One of the events that have 
attracted public attention is the action against 
radicalism at the Sarinah shopping center, 
Central Jakarta. President Joko Widodo has 
swiftly issued various counter-terrorism and 
radicalism policies in Indonesia where the 
revocation of the legal license of the HTI 
organization is one form of implementation of 
these policies even though in 2016, the 
Terrorism Law was already in effect. However, 
none have been ratified immediately or are still 
under discussion and are being discussed with 
other Indonesian public authorities. 
Revocation of HTI‘s legal permits has become 
a scourge in various Muslim communities where 
there are pros and cons. One demonstration in 
2019 was carried out by the 212 alliance, which 
accused Jokowi of criminalizing many clerics in 
Indonesia and revoking legal permits. HTI 
organizations. Demonstration targeting Jokowi 
subject anger is a form of transition to the 
political agenda carried out by those who are 
members of the 212 alliance, which in the 
beginning was demanding that the Jakarta 
Governor called "Ahok" be sentenced to prison 
for the accusation of blasphemy during his 2016 
official visit to the Kepulauan Seribu (BBC News 
2016). 
In Indonesia, they are reluctant to show total 
rejection of democracy through the party 
system. The party system means legitimizing the 
democratic system which is rejected by the 
reality of radical movements in Indonesia and 
other countries reminiscent of the trap theory of 
democracy. The militant group took action at the 
end of the operation to seize political power. 
Indeed, many radical groups do not want to 
participate in the whole political system. 
However, this does not mean that they do not 
want to have supreme power in a country. They 
still want to take control in their way (Hilmy 
2015). 
The Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict 
(IPAC) reports the action of the 212 alliance 
purely contained a practical political agenda 
wrapped up in religious issues as an attraction 
for the solidarity of Muslims in Indonesia to join 
in a demonstration which pushed Joko Widodo 
to fail to be re-elected as President of Indonesia, 
but the final result of the Constitutional Court's 
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decision showed that President Joko Widodo 
was again elected as President of Indonesia for 
the second period (Putri 2019). 
The euphoria of the 2019 Presidential 
Election is felt in Jakarta and in the areas where 
the implementation of the Presidential Election 
is also very dynamic, especially the dichotomy 
between the Jokowi and Prabowo camps. 
Yogyakarta is on the phenomenon of the radical 
movement that occurred after the 2019 
Presidential Election. In this study, researchers 
focused on the current condition of groups 
classified as radical groups, namely Hizbuth 
Tahrir Indonesia. In the research that the 
researcher conducted, the finding that caught 
the attention of the researchers was that this HTI 
group was still operating actively in the social 
community in Yogyakarta. So, the formulation of 
the problem study is "How does the 
transformation of radical movement in 
Yogyakarta Post 2019 Presidential Election?" 
This study uses the theory of resource 
mobilization social movements. In this theory, 
the researcher focuses on Islamic activities 
rather than ideology, in the sense that the author 
sees the mobilization and analysis of collective 
action and protests that have increased 
significantly in response to social movements of 
the people who have taken to the streets and are 
anarchic that demand specific demands. Political 
policy is an ancient form of social movement. 
Dissatisfaction with the old anarchist social 
movement model pushed the contemporary 
social movement theory thinker, Anthony 
Obserchall, to develop a new idea related to 
social movements, namely "the theory of 
resource mobilization." Old model social move-
ment theory considers street political action to 
be an expression of an irrational and deprived 
mass mentality. Resource mobilization theory 
tends to see social movements as a form of 
organized, rational collective action and has 
specific goals that are consciously formulated. So 
that success in this theory is determined by the 
intelligence of social movement actors who 
organize members' sense of dissent to minimize 
the risks that may arise and at the same time 
utilize existing social solidarity networks and 
even share incentives to reach mutual consensus 
(Oberschall 1973). 
Social movement theory offers a middle 
ground between structuralist schools that focus 
on the system, namely the state and international 
relations, and schools of rational choice that favor 
individual roles. Unlike the two schools, the 
theory of social mobilization of resources takes 
groups as a unit of analysis. Still, it recognizes the 
individuals involved in it as a form of collective 
action with free choice. This social movement 
theory of resource mobilization explains that 
options do not occur in a vacuum, out of context, 
changing networks and relationships. In contrast, 
social resource mobilization theory assumes that 
structural changes in creating conditions lead to 
collective action. 
This theory emphasizes the issue of com-
monality rooted in the process, how a movement 
can arise, under what conditions it allows a 
disappointment to a mobilization. Resource 
mobilization usually arises in long-established 
social networks. Through this network, the 
masses and sympathizers are recruited and 
mobilized. In mobilizing the masses, social 
movement actors frame planned actions with 
slogans and language that are easy to understand 
and represent and move members' sentiments. 
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The resource mobilization social movement 
explains how the dynamics, the process, the 
organization of activism. The movement 
emerged rationally, arising from certain political 
dynamics that went through a mobilization 
process and involved a recruitment network 
polished with a touch of ideology through proper 
framing (Hasan 2006). 
Islamic activism tends to utilize informal 
social networks that have been formed through 
personal relationships. The Muslim Brother-
hood, which is a formal organization, also 
consists of dynamic informal networks that rely 
on family, friendship, and collegial connections. 
As examples of its activities are Mahwah in 
mosques, recitation in homes, interpretation 
forums in Musholla, Islamic print media that are 
packaged excitingly. Networks like this are 
overgrowing and are ready to be mobilized with 
the art of mobilization (Hasan 2006). 
Radical ideology encourages Islam to create a 
radical Islamic movement. Radical Islam is 
thought to be a forerunner to the growth of 
terrorism. Hergianasari's study finds that the 
radical movement tends to change the nation's 
ideology from Pancasila to Radical Islam. 
However, to eliminate such ideology, the role of 
the state to fight terrorism is very large, as 
Jokowi has done to disperse HTI, which is 
allegedly a radical Islamic mass organization. 
The radical organizations have been 
transformed into informal organizations whose 
teachings enter the midst society in's midst 
structured and massive manner (Hergianasari 
2018). 
Hergianasari  (2019) explains that the factors 
of violent extremism based on Islamic religion, 
which flourished recently by using three 
combinations of theories as Primordialism, 
Constructivism, and Instrumentalism, are stated 
three theories could not stand alone but its 
interrelation as a dimension of the case. It proves 
that the feeling one is psychologically and 
supported and united by dogma as a framework 
can make a community into one entity and turn 
into radicalism. There is evidence that the 
political figures have tricked people of the group 
as a tool for them to accomplish their goals. 
When they can fulfill their goals, a discrepancy of 
power inevitably is happening. Thus, the 
implementation of their power will be erupted 
and lead to the nations' misery. 
In a study examining the Cairo case, Diane 
Singerman explained that informal social 
networks have cultural validity because they are 
integrated with the community. The network 
can function as a movement resource for the 
recruitment of collective actions. Through this 
network, solidarity and collective identity can be 
built, enabling mobilization effectively and free 
riding (Singerman and Amar 2006). 
Janine A. Clark, in her research in Yemen 
explained how social movement activists used 
Qur'anic study groups to reproduce messages 
and support activity agendas where the move-
ment could facilitate community involvement in 
various class segments (Clark 2004). 
Lorne L. Dawson argues that the Western 
model or recruitment of religious denominations 
uses existing social networks and interpersonal 
relationships. Not only that, but the model used 
also includes recruiting friends from friends and 
family members. Members and neighbors are 
recruiting neighbors (Gallagher 2007). 
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This research is different from previous 
research that transformed the radical movement 
after the 2019 Presidential Election, which 
political interests have ridden. At the same time, 
the movement has a radical ideology and wants 
to replace the government with a government. 
Khilafah, like a symbiotic mutualism mutual. 
However, in Yogyakarta, researchers found 
different things regarding the transformation of 
the radical movement after the 2019 Pre-
sidential Election, where the movement was a 
massive and structured transformation, first but 
the movement mobilized resources. As a result, 
they are now acting cautiously, no longer on the 
road, and acting anarchically, but carrying out 
informal movements through informal 
organizations packaged according to each 
member's segment, both millennials and even 
philanthropists. 
This study uses descriptive qualitative 
methods by collecting data using field obser-
vation techniques, interviews, and related 
documents. The study was conducted with un-
structured observations, namely observations 
made without using observation guidelines. In 
this observation, the researcher personally 
develops the power of observation in observing 
research objects. Researchers observe the trans-
formation of the radical movement after the 
2019 Presidential Election in Yogyakarta. 
Researchers conducted interviews by inter-
viewing the D.I. Yogyakarta National Unity and 
Politics Agency lecturers from the UGM Center 
for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) 
as well as several students involved in research 
on the fundamental movement. Document data 
was obtained through online data searches, data 
from the Institutions of National Unity and 
Politics, and books, journals, and articles related 
to the radical movement. 
The researcher descends directly into the 
field to interview related informants or 
informants who follow informal organizations. 
The researcher also made observations to see 
and observe directly. The obstacle was that the 
researcher did not ask questions directly related 
to the informal organization's missions but 
rather indirectly searched so as not to arouse 
suspicion. 
Transforming HTI Activities After 2019 
Presidential Election 
Mohammad Iqbal Ahnaf briefly explains HTI 
community behavior in Indonesia. HTI has been 
in Indonesia since the early 1980s.They prefer to 
move massively using underground methods 
and targeting their teachings to university 
students in Indonesia. HTI gained a wider scope 
when the Soeharto government ended. HTI is 
known as a Salafi-based organization, and holds 
the Tarbiyah ideology owned by Taqiyuddin an-
Nabhani as the founder of Hizbuth Tahrir in 
struggling for the Khilafah  values (Ahnaf 2017). 
HTI is very active in publishing its teachings 
on campuses and through many printed media 
such as the Al-Islam Bulletin, which is published 
once a week, and Al-Wa'ie magazine. HTI 
obtained permission as a community organiza-
tion in Indonesia from the Ministry of Home 
Affairs in 2006 through a license letter number 
44 / D.III.2 / VI / 2006. Based on this letter HTI 
may carry out teaching activities like religious 
preaching as well as responding to the ongoing 
government in Indonesia. The freedom of HTI 
during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's 
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administration has helped HTI expand its wings 
to take part in the Islamic world in Indonesia to 
spread teachings that are under their ideology. 
HTI organizes activities such as Tabillig Akbar 
and demonstrations as their movement for 
showing organization's political ethics. They 
consider this method is strategic for conveying 
their Islamic political thought. On the next step, 
there are some controversies regarding to some 
activities which are considered as radical. Even 
HTI activities are considered to threaten the 
Republic of Indonesia's integrity because they are 
considered to be contrary to Pancasila. With the 
emergence of stigma and concerns, the govern-
ment decided to dissolve HTI (Muazaroh 2019). 
The existence of HTI has been limited by the 
regulation enacted by President Joko Widodo in 
2016 through Law Number 2 of 2017, which 
acts as a substitute for Law Number 17 of 2013 
concerning social organizations. However, HTI 
continues to carry out various teaching activities 
and uses the same method at the former times. 
There are several campuses in Yogyakarta used 
as a medium for disseminating khilafah ideology, 
such as at UGM (Gadjah Mada University) and 
UNY (Yogyakarta State University) (Koes 2019). 
One researcher from CRCS UGM stated that 
the enactment of the new regulation related to 
social organization did not HTI convert the 
activities to become more hidden. Still, contrary, 
the HTI members carried out their activities 
openly and there was an increase in their 
enthusiasm to fight for the values of Khilafah in 
Indonesia. The location used by the HTI group 
for activities is in the UGM campus mosque, but 
at this time UGM has acted to suppress HTI 
group activities within UGM.  
In expanding its teachings HTI often uses 
social media as a promotional platform and 
propaganda media. The role of social media has 
long been used before the enactment of 
government regulation related to social organi-
zation. The various activities that HTI allegedly 
initiated were routine ḥalaqah, intellectual 
discussion forums, mudzakarah figure and 
ulama, Muslim United, educational activities, 
business economics, and arts and cultural 
events. 
To maintain self-existence amidst pressure 
and pressure from the state. HTI has used 
various methods and information to keep its 
activities going. Some of the movement trans-
formations carried out by HTI will be explained 
by the researchers in the following items 
Informal Social Network 
First, the ḥalaqah is an activity carried out by 
HTI members, usually filled with weekly and 
monthly studies. In studies conducted every 
month, HTI members often invite speakers from 
outside. 
Ḥalaqah is the main means of the tarbiyah 
(education) process aimed at strengthening 
relationships with Allah by using the talaqqi 
(direct learning) method in a group dynamic so 
that an intensive process of interaction occurs 
between each other so that there is a process of 
reflecting on influencing, and training together-
ness within the scope of cooperation neatly 
arranged, with a maximum number of members 
of 12 people. The limitation of the number of 
ḥalaqah participants to 12 people is based on the 
consideration of the effectiveness of the learning 
process in the supervision and control of 
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learning activities outside the ḥalaqah. This 
figure is not an absolute number, because the 
most important thing is how educators ensure 
the fulfillment of the learning needs of ḥalaqah 
participants, both inside and outside ḥalaqah. an 
educator must try to give the ḥalaqah 
participants the rights both inside and outside 
the ḥalaqah. A murabbi must try to communicate 
(stay in touch) with all his mutarabbi (ḥalaqah 
participants) within a week (Amirudin 2016). 
 Ḥalaqah activity itself is carried out in a 
nomadic way and is dominated by students 
discussing economic, political, and educational 
system issues. HTI members who are in the 
campus environment, such as at UGM call 
themselves maḥali. Maḥali UGM often rents 
cafes, shops, and hotels to carry out these 
activities, while maḥali UIN and UNY choose to 
conduct ḥalaqah activities in the open space 
according to their funds. 
In ḥalaqah, it consists of various agendas that 
are carried out massively and packaged as 
attractive as possible to attract members and 
guests who are usually targeted at Muslim 
students and ordinary Muslim citizens. One of 
the agendas in ḥalaqah which is very well 
known and managed to attract the attention of 
many Muslims is "YukNgaji" (let's take the 
Koran), Felix Siauw initiator of this agenda. This 
ḥalaqah has been held in various cities in 
Indonesia. 
The attraction of the "YukNgaji" program 
which is on the agenda in this ḥalaqah is packed 
with young people's tastes. In the beginning, this 
activity used HTI figures from young people like 
Hawariyun, Shifrun, and Fuad Naim. In the 
"YukNgaji" program there are various activities 
including 1) Ngefast, this activity was originally 
known as KEY (YukNgaji Executive Class) and 
contains teaching using HTI doctrines and each 
participant must provide an infaq of Rp. 250,000. 
- 2) "NgeFast for Kids" is not much different from 
NgeFast in general but this enterprising is filled 
with various practices. 3) Xkwavers, this activity 
is carried out to encourage young people to leave 
the K-Pop trend, which is still often mush-
rooming among young people. 4) dehallyusinasi, 
this activity is focused on helping and increasing 
the awareness of Muslim youths to migrate. 
Second, the Intellectual Forum, this activity is 
one of the elite events which is closed and only 
limited people who take part in this activity, and 
in fact, the participants come from HTI members 
themselves, and the location of the activity is 
often done in hotels.  
Third, Multaqa Ulama Aswaja/Mudzakarah 
Figures and Ulama/Jalsa Ammah Ulama, this 
activity is carried out at the regional/city level, 
followed by the ulama who enter the HTI 
network and are not routinely carried out and 
are not contained in the structural HTI. 
According to researchers' findings, several 
regions have held this event, namely Bogor, 
Garut, Probolinggo, Madura, Samarinda, and 
Sumedang. 
Fourth, Muslim United (MU) is a united 
alliance formed after a variety of demonstrations 
in 2016, which Nanang Syaifurozi founded. 
According to the researcher's results, Nanang 
Syaifurozi himself has a close relationship with 
the HTI group. The key figures of Muslim United 
are Salim Fillah (Jogokaryan), Syukri Fadloli 
(Yogyakarta Ukhuwah Islamiyah Forum), Steven 
Indra Wibowo (Indonesian Mualaf Center), and 
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several figures. Also, MU uses several public 
figures in attracting the attention of other 
Muslims such as Ustad Abdul Somad (UAS), 
Ustad Adi Hidayat (UAH), Felix Siauw, Oemar 
Mita, Hannan Attaki, Muhammad Bin Anies 
Shahab, and Lukmanul Hakim and referred to as 
The Avengers as a symbol of unity of the people. 
The group's movement, which is seen as thick 
with radical values, especially those in 
Yogyakarta, is an alliance of the unity of Muslims, 
namely the Muslim United (MU) network. 
Researchers have encountered various 
difficulties in searching for the background of the 
formation of this alliance, but using various 
research meetings that discuss this MU group has 
made it easy for researchers to obtain various 
information about MU. 
MU is generally understood as an alliance 
formed after 212 actions that took place during 
2016-2019. The bearers/initiators expect MU to 
be a means to maintain the strength of the unity 
of both Muslims who are participants in the 212 
action or other Muslims in Indonesia. The 
initiator from MU who is famous mainly based on 
information that researchers got from the HTI 
research movement in Yogyakarta is a business-
man who is the owner of "Rumah Warna", 
Nanang Syaifurozi. Rumah Warna is very well 
known by Indonesian people, both across ages 
and gender. Various products from "Rumah 
Warna" such as bags and wallets for women have 
spread all over Indonesia. Nanang Syaifurozi 
himself started his business since 2002 and was 
called to behave in a range of 2016. The 
background is why Nanang Syaifurozi made a 
move and formed MU as a place to unite Muslims 
because he was unable to restrain his emotions 
and disappointment in seeing the many Muslims 
blame each other. 
The beginning of the MU movement began in 
October 2018 where Nanang Syaifurozi along 
with several figures such as Fani (Jogokaryan), 
Syukri Fadloli (Yogyakarta Ukhuwah Islamiyah 
Forum), Andi Antoni (Indonesia Mualaf Center), 
Akhid (Teras Da'wah), and several key figures in 
the movement. Muslim United held their first 
event in the context of Tablig Akbar on 16-18 
October 2018 at the Kauman Gedhe Mosque in 
Yogyakarta. The second Muslim United event 
was held on 11-13 October 2019 at the 
Jogokaryan mosque. They invited several well-
known public figures among Muslims such as 
Ustadz Abdul Shomad (UAS), Ustad Adi Hidayat 
(UAH), Felix Siauw, Oemar Mita, Hannan Attaki, 
Muhammad Bin Anies Shahab and Lukmanul 
Hakim. These names became teachers who were 
often brought in by the MU preaching event and 
they were named as MU "The Avengers". 
In 2019 MU made a big break where they 
expanded the teaching space by forming a 
philanthropic foundation in 2019 named Muslim 
Ukhuwwah. Through the formation of this 
foundation MU ventured to implement a profes-
sional management model. The vision of the 
Ukhuwwah Muslim Foundation is "to be a 
credible, creative, and innovative Islamic 
philanthropic institution that plays an active role 
in community charity for the people in Islamic 
civilization". Without a mission, surely that vision 
cannot be achieved so that MU forms the mission 
of the foundation, namely: 1) Campaigning the 
importance of Ukhwah Islamiyah to Muslims by 
holding various da'wah and social events. 2) 
Helping the community's welfare to get a decent 
life in terms of material and education. 3) Take 
part in helping our brothers and sisters in Sham. 
4) Participate in the movement to develop the 
country through environmental campaign activi-
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ties such as "Less Waste, Go Green." 5) Managing 
and empowering funds from profitable business 
proceeds and donations, alms, endowments, and 
donations for foundation activities in the social 
and propaganda fields. 
The development of MU through the 
foundations that they form shows us a pattern of 
management that is formed in stages by focusing 
on three things, namely: 1) charity, 2) social 
charity/da'wah and 3) charity education. 
As one of the initiators who played a lot in 
establishing MU, Nanang Syaifurozi realized that 
managing MU would require a large number of 
funds to support various activities both routinely 
every month or in a certain period. Based on the 
findings at the first MU meeting, the budget 
spent was around Rp. 800,000,000 and 
increased at the second MU meeting of Rp. 
2,900,000,000. This fund is needed to support 
the grand meeting and several UM needs. 
Therefore, UM made various efforts to collect 
various sources of funding. One of them is from 
the merchandise provided by UM. The per-
centage of funds from donations is obtained 
through infaq and fundraising. Then they divide 
the donation into several basic needs, namely 
social activities, education and preaching; ¼ for 
rice ATMs, ¼ for education at the At-Tasnim 
boarding school, ¼ for donations in the Islamic 
world such as Palestine, Uyghur, Rohingya, etc., 
and ¼ the rest to finance the studies conducted. 
Not only from donations, but they also sell 
merchandise such as t-shirts, caps, and drinking 
bottles (Tumblr). MU did not forget those who 
work in the field so that from donations, 
fundraising, and merchandise, sales proceeds 
are also distributed as salaries for employees. 
The scale of merchandise sales that were 
successfully sold in the previous months was 
around 5000 pcs/month and benefited from 
Rp's tumblr sales. 10,000/bottle, so if you 
calculate the amount of profit that you can get 
MU every month is Rp. 50,000,000. MU's 
contribution to the program of protecting the 
environment, known as the hashtag #lesswaste 
and #bringyourowntumblr, shows that there is a 
form of contribution in MU's financial income, 
especially in supporting the charitable efforts of 
the business obtained from selling merchandise. 
We need to know that MU funding sources are 
also obtained from several entrepreneurs where 
MU is trying to establish close relationships with 
some of these entrepreneurs, especially from 
entrepreneurs who emigrated. The contribution 
of these entrepreneurs can help fund several 
events where collaboration between them and 
MU has also been successful in mobilizing 
charitable endeavors for the field of educational 
development. 
The relationship between MU and HTI has 
seen from the mutual symbiosis between them 
that MU provides space for HTI to develop; this 
can be seen from the contribution of Felix Siauw 
as part of "The Avengers" and some ustad as the 
backbone in the implementation of various 
propaganda MU. There is finding that in the color 
complex of the house, which is the headquarters 
of MU, it is often found that there are HTI 
activities such as study activities carried out, in 
addition to the MU office the "YukNgaji" office is 
also used to conduct HTI studies/events and 
most importantly to see the relationship 
between MU and HTI can be seen from the 
opinion of MU chairman, Nanang Syaifurozi who 
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supports the Khilafah as researchers get from 
the recorded interviews conducted by several 
researchers who discuss HTI in a different 
research context with this research. Nanang 
Syaifurozi said:  
"I asked the Avenger ustadz. According to 
this ustadz, what about this Khilafah? 
Because what I know, the ones who fight for, 
talk about the Khilafah directly are just 
Ustadz Felix Xiauw or Abdul Somad, 
sometimes. Yes, it's a scourge. What is the 
cleric's answer? Now Muslims, if they don't 
miss the application of the Shari'a, which 
means the Khilafah, it is questionable 
whether they believe in Islam or not. In what 
ways do each struggle, if the preaching does 
not lead to that (Khilafah), it is questionable". 
When confirmed whether the khilafah in 
question is identical to HTI, he said:  
"That is only a person's understanding that is 
too narrow. Those who speak out loud in 
front and without cover are only HTI. For 
others, such as FPI, they only voiced an 
invitation in the form of a sharia Indonesia 
and did not dare to speak using the words of 
the Khilafah. Thus, the Khilafah is identical to 
HTI. Khilafah is the language of the Qur'an. 
Khilafah means the leader is called Khalifah, 
while the system is called Khilafah. That 
many people do not understand because of 
ignorance. I used to understand this was 
quite narrow. Once learned again from 
various sources, and apparently from the 
book learned from elementary school, 
Islamic Jurisprudence book, the main book is 
NU and the markets. In the last chapter, 
there is a discussion of the Khilafah. There is 
a duty of the Khilafah." 
Thus, it has been seen that Nanang Syafurozi 
as the initiator of MU who actively plays a role in 
teaching with HTI supports the establishment 
and enforcement of the Khilafah in Indonesia. 
According to Nanang Syaifurozi, the clerics who 
are members of Muslim United support the 
establishment of the Khilafah. They agree about 
the obligation to establish it. 
Fifth, Education, Economics, and Business. 
HTI, through their education, economy, and 
business sectors, is affiliated with several 
educational institutions and business institutions 
such as STIE Hamfara, At-Turats A-Islami 
Foundation, which is currently developing the 
Syaroful Haramain Ma'had Wakaf project under 
the guidance of Hafidz Abdurrahman, Cinta 
Qur'an foundation under Fatih Karim who 
founded Cinta Qur'an (Training Institute for 
Reading and Translating the Qur'an) and in the 
HTI business sector expanded its wings to Royal 
Indonesia Travel (Umrah and Islamic Tour), 
Alanabi (Herbal Vitamins/Supplement), Fatih 
Indonesia (Clothing Brand), and established the 
Al Fatih shelter. He is also behind 
@kajianperkantoran and @kajianmuslimahid 
which is engaged in the management of religious 
teachers. Some registered service users from PT. 
PLN Banten, Prudential, Sampoerna, PT. Astra, 
Central DKI Bank, Oil Company PT. SPR Langgak, 
BNI Margonda, XL, PT. Suzuki Indomobil Motor, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, GMF AeroAsia, 
Directorate General of Oil and Gas, Telkom, and 
many others. At the same time, Felix Siauw 
developed Al Fatih Studio, which is engaged in 
creating Da'wah content, Hijab Alila, Alila Kids, 
Alila Goods.  
Sixth, through Art and Culture, Not only 
playing in the realm of seriousness and focusing 
on the spiritual aspects, but HTI also seeks to 
attract some art practitioners such as the Khat. 
Arts group who introduces Khilafah ideas 
through painting and calligraphy, Ki Dalang Lutfi 
Caritogomo who spreads the idea of Khilafah 
through wayang, and various entertainment 
Putri Hergianasari, Kurniawan Netanyahu  
JSW (Jurnal Sosiologi Walisongo) – Volume 5, No. 1 (2021) 104 │ 
programs through the HijrahFest agenda and 
creative propaganda. 
The Figure 1 explains that the transformation 
of the radical movement (anarchists) took to the 
streets to be more directed and organized by 
entering the community through religious 
education and study groups, both at universities 
and household gatherings. Related to political 
factors is the organization that is meant by the 
vision and mission that is not based on Pancasila 
and wants to change Indonesia's foundation, 
namely Pancasila, into the Khilafah and will have 
the same fate as HTI, which is to be dissolved. 
This calm transformation becomes one way to 
keep the radical organization in existence but in 
a friendlier frame or guise. Economic factors are 
also one of the obstacles the organization moves 
directly down in a disorderly manner because it 
is like that which costs money. The driving factor 
is the ideology and culture of their beliefs that 
the Pancasila is not following the Khilafah and is 
considered a Thaghut. 
The radical movement transformation 
mentioned above is in line with the theory of 
social mobilization of resources which says that 
commonality is an important element in 
mobilizing resources (Wiktorowicz 2004).  
A movement that can emerge like Muslim United 
 
 
Figure 1.  
Map of Concept Radical Movement Transformation in Yogyakarta
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(MU) is a form of disappointment that metamor-
phoses into a mobilization. This is a trans-
formation from HTI that has been formed for a 
long time. Through this network, the masses and 
sympathizers can be recruited and mobilized. In 
mobilizing the masses, actors such as The 
Avengers also frame the planned actions with a 
Da'wah frame and bring in capital artists. 
Activities for millennials are also framed by 
slogans and language that is current and easy to 
understand, namely Ngefast, Xkwavers. The 
social movement of resource mobilization arises 
rationally due to a certain political condition that 
is considered incompatible with their ideology. 
The 2019 general election was marked by 
religious sentiment as a campaign. politicians 
and radical mass organizations work together in 
symbiotic mutualism. political elites ride radical 
mass organizations and radical mass organi-
zations also ride political elites. Regarding the 
dynamics of the relationship between the 
parties, this attention should focus on the 
reciprocity, interaction and multi-faceted nature 
of competition, as well as the cumulative impact 
of these characteristics on the trajectory of 
competition. As a participant, group or organi-
zation in a social movement put forward pro-
positions that may affect the state and potential 
other non-state parties (Alimi, Bosi, and 
Demetriou 2015). Their activities trigger a series 
of interactive actions that cancel each other out 
and sometimes even include violence. Whether 
it is short-lived, continuous, or violent, whether 
the dispute is sudden, intermittent or gradual, or 
at the center or periphery of mainstream politics, 
it is impossible to make accurate predictions in 
advance because the event's progress depends 
on multiple relationships and interact. 
Although specific relational dynamics may 
have a unique influence on radicalization, they 
cannot be treated independently of other 
relational dynamics in other interaction frame-
works that may have their own unique influence. 
As we have done, using mechanisms to 
conceptualize relationship dynamics means that 
the interactions between mechanisms derived 
from different interactions may be important. 
Consider the following illustration of this 
interaction. Although hypothetical, the recurring 
relationship mechanism has been captured in 
many radical events. Political constraints or 
threats to new developments in the movement's 
space for action or the ability to promote its 
goals, which we label as a spiral of political 
opportunities, may intensify competition for 
power among sports organizations and cause 
one or more people to take action. More 
confrontational and even violent strategies are 
more of these organizations. After one or more 
Social Movement Organizations (SMOs) 
implement what is considered a more effective 
competitive strategy, it may cause social control 
personnel to take severe repressive measures 
against them. The entire campaign, in turn, may 
cause that same SMOs or other SMOs to raise 
bets and adopt more confrontational strategies. 
Conclusion  
This study's conclusion is the transformation 
of radical movements after the 2019 Presidential 
Election and post-dissolution of HTI mass 
organizations. The members are increasingly 
active in disseminating radical understanding 
through Ḥalaqah, Intellectual Forum, Multaqa 
Ulama Aswaja/Mudzakarah Figure, and Ulama/ 
Jalsa Ammah Ulama, Muslim United (MU) 
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economic and business education, as well as 
through art which is carried out in a structured 
and massive way into cells both within student 
organizations to the studies of philanthropist.[] 
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